cregit-Linux how code gets into the kernel

Release 4.14 arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c

Directory: arch/x86/mm
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
 * This file implements KASLR memory randomization for x86_64. It randomizes
 * the virtual address space of kernel memory regions (physical memory
 * mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates
 * exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses.
 *
 * Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in
 * the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is
 * done on PGD & P4D/PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses.
 * The physical memory mapping code was adapted to support P4D/PUD level
 * virtual addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides
 * 30,000 possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region.
 * An additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with
 * a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).
 *
 * The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at
 * the available space for the regions based on different configuration
 * options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the
 * physical memory mapping is the available physical memory.
 */

#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/random.h>

#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/kaslr.h>

#include "mm_internal.h"


#define TB_SHIFT 40

/*
 * Virtual address start and end range for randomization. The end changes base
 * on configuration to have the highest amount of space for randomization.
 * It increases the possible random position for each randomized region.
 *
 * You need to add an if/def entry if you introduce a new memory region
 * compatible with KASLR. Your entry must be in logical order with memory
 * layout. For example, ESPFIX is before EFI because its virtual address is
 * before. You also need to add a BUILD_BUG_ON() in kernel_randomize_memory() to
 * ensure that this order is correct and won't be changed.
 */

static const unsigned long vaddr_start = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE;

#if defined(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64)

static const unsigned long vaddr_end = ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR;
#elif defined(CONFIG_EFI)

static const unsigned long vaddr_end = EFI_VA_END;
#else

static const unsigned long vaddr_end = __START_KERNEL_map;
#endif

/* Default values */

unsigned long page_offset_base = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE;

EXPORT_SYMBOL(page_offset_base);

unsigned long vmalloc_base = __VMALLOC_BASE;

EXPORT_SYMBOL(vmalloc_base);

unsigned long vmemmap_base = __VMEMMAP_BASE;

EXPORT_SYMBOL(vmemmap_base);

/*
 * Memory regions randomized by KASLR (except modules that use a separate logic
 * earlier during boot). The list is ordered based on virtual addresses. This
 * order is kept after randomization.
 */

static __initdata struct kaslr_memory_region {
	
unsigned long *base;
	
unsigned long size_tb;
} 
kaslr_regions[] = {
	{ &page_offset_base, 1 << (__PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT - TB_SHIFT) /* Maximum */ },
	{ &vmalloc_base, VMALLOC_SIZE_TB },
	{ &vmemmap_base, 1 },
};

/* Get size in bytes used by the memory region */

static inline unsigned long get_padding(struct kaslr_memory_region *region) { return (region->size_tb << TB_SHIFT); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Thomas Garnier22100.00%1100.00%
Total22100.00%1100.00%

/* * Apply no randomization if KASLR was disabled at boot or if KASAN * is enabled. KASAN shadow mappings rely on regions being PGD aligned. */
static inline bool kaslr_memory_enabled(void) { return kaslr_enabled() && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Thomas Garnier1894.74%150.00%
Masahiro Yamada15.26%150.00%
Total19100.00%2100.00%

/* Initialize base and padding for each memory region randomized with KASLR */
void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void) { size_t i; unsigned long vaddr = vaddr_start; unsigned long rand, memory_tb; struct rnd_state rand_state; unsigned long remain_entropy; /* * All these BUILD_BUG_ON checks ensures the memory layout is * consistent with the vaddr_start/vaddr_end variables. */ BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_start >= vaddr_end); BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64) && vaddr_end >= EFI_VA_END); BUILD_BUG_ON((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) && vaddr_end >= __START_KERNEL_map); BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_end > __START_KERNEL_map); if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) return; /* * Update Physical memory mapping to available and * add padding if needed (especially for memory hotplug support). */ BUG_ON(kaslr_regions[0].base != &page_offset_base); memory_tb = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, 1UL << TB_SHIFT) + CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING; /* Adapt phyiscal memory region size based on available memory */ if (memory_tb < kaslr_regions[0].size_tb) kaslr_regions[0].size_tb = memory_tb; /* Calculate entropy available between regions */ remain_entropy = vaddr_end - vaddr_start; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++) remain_entropy -= get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]); prandom_seed_state(&rand_state, kaslr_get_random_long("Memory")); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++) { unsigned long entropy; /* * Select a random virtual address using the extra entropy * available. */ entropy = remain_entropy / (ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions) - i); prandom_bytes_state(&rand_state, &rand, sizeof(rand)); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) entropy = (rand % (entropy + 1)) & P4D_MASK; else entropy = (rand % (entropy + 1)) & PUD_MASK; vaddr += entropy; *kaslr_regions[i].base = vaddr; /* * Jump the region and add a minimum padding based on * randomization alignment. */ vaddr += get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) vaddr = round_up(vaddr + 1, P4D_SIZE); else vaddr = round_up(vaddr + 1, PUD_SIZE); remain_entropy -= entropy; } }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Thomas Garnier28086.15%562.50%
Kirill A. Shutemov4112.62%112.50%
Masahiro Yamada30.92%112.50%
Baoquan He10.31%112.50%
Total325100.00%8100.00%


static void __meminit init_trampoline_pud(void) { unsigned long paddr, paddr_next; pgd_t *pgd; pud_t *pud_page, *pud_page_tramp; int i; pud_page_tramp = alloc_low_page(); paddr = 0; pgd = pgd_offset_k((unsigned long)__va(paddr)); pud_page = (pud_t *) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd); for (i = pud_index(paddr); i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++, paddr = paddr_next) { pud_t *pud, *pud_tramp; unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr); pud_tramp = pud_page_tramp + pud_index(paddr); pud = pud_page + pud_index(vaddr); paddr_next = (paddr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE; *pud_tramp = *pud; } set_pgd(&trampoline_pgd_entry, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pud_page_tramp))); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Thomas Garnier15498.72%150.00%
Kirill A. Shutemov21.28%150.00%
Total156100.00%2100.00%


static void __meminit init_trampoline_p4d(void) { unsigned long paddr, paddr_next; pgd_t *pgd; p4d_t *p4d_page, *p4d_page_tramp; int i; p4d_page_tramp = alloc_low_page(); paddr = 0; pgd = pgd_offset_k((unsigned long)__va(paddr)); p4d_page = (p4d_t *) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd); for (i = p4d_index(paddr); i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++, paddr = paddr_next) { p4d_t *p4d, *p4d_tramp; unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr); p4d_tramp = p4d_page_tramp + p4d_index(paddr); p4d = p4d_page + p4d_index(vaddr); paddr_next = (paddr & P4D_MASK) + P4D_SIZE; *p4d_tramp = *p4d; } set_pgd(&trampoline_pgd_entry, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(p4d_page_tramp))); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Kirill A. Shutemov156100.00%1100.00%
Total156100.00%1100.00%

/* * Create PGD aligned trampoline table to allow real mode initialization * of additional CPUs. Consume only 1 low memory page. */
void __meminit init_trampoline(void) { if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) { init_trampoline_default(); return; } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) init_trampoline_p4d(); else init_trampoline_pud(); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Kirill A. Shutemov34100.00%1100.00%
Total34100.00%1100.00%


Overall Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Thomas Garnier62871.61%654.55%
Kirill A. Shutemov24227.59%19.09%
Masahiro Yamada40.46%218.18%
Baoquan He20.23%19.09%
Greg Kroah-Hartman10.11%19.09%
Total877100.00%11100.00%
Directory: arch/x86/mm
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