Release 4.16 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
/*
* TPM handling.
*
* Copyright (C) 2016 CoreOS, Inc
* Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
* Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
* Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
*
* This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
* terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
*/
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include "efistub.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
static const efi_char16_t efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name[] = {
'M', 'e', 'm', 'o', 'r', 'y', 'O', 'v', 'e', 'r', 'w', 'r', 'i', 't',
'e', 'R', 'e', 'q', 'u', 'e', 's', 't', 'C', 'o', 'n', 't', 'r', 'o',
'l', 0
};
#define MEMORY_ONLY_RESET_CONTROL_GUID \
EFI_GUID(0xe20939be, 0x32d4, 0x41be, 0xa1, 0x50, 0x89, 0x7f, 0x85, 0xd4, 0x98, 0x29)
#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
__VA_ARGS__)
#define set_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
efi_call_runtime(set_variable, \
(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
__VA_ARGS__)
/*
* Enable reboot attack mitigation. This requests that the firmware clear the
* RAM on next reboot before proceeding with boot, ensuring that any secrets
* are cleared. If userland has ensured that all secrets have been removed
* from RAM before reboot it can simply reset this variable.
*/
void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
u8 val = 1;
efi_guid_t var_guid = MEMORY_ONLY_RESET_CONTROL_GUID;
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long datasize = 0;
status = get_efi_var(efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name, &var_guid,
NULL, &datasize, NULL);
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
return;
set_efi_var(efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name, &var_guid,
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, sizeof(val), &val);
}
Contributors
| Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp |
| Matthew Garrett | 74 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |
| Total | 74 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |
#endif
void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
efi_status_t status;
efi_physical_addr_t log_location, log_last_entry;
struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl = NULL;
unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
efi_bool_t truncated;
void *tcg2_protocol = NULL;
status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
&tcg2_protocol);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
return;
status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log, tcg2_protocol,
EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2,
&log_location, &log_last_entry, &truncated);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
return;
if (!log_location)
return;
first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
/*
* We populate the EFI table even if the logs are empty.
*/
if (!log_last_entry) {
log_size = 0;
} else {
last_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_last_entry;
/*
* get_event_log only returns the address of the last entry.
* We need to calculate its size to deduce the full size of
* the logs.
*/
last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
log_size = log_last_entry - log_location + last_entry_size;
}
/* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size,
(void **) &log_tbl);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
efi_printk(sys_table_arg,
"Unable to allocate memory for event log\n");
return;
}
memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
log_tbl->size = log_size;
log_tbl->version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
&linux_eventlog_guid, log_tbl);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto err_free;
return;
err_free:
efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
}
Contributors
| Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp |
| Thiébaud Weksteen | 281 | 98.60% | 1 | 50.00% |
| Ard Biesheuvel | 4 | 1.40% | 1 | 50.00% |
| Total | 285 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |
void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
/* Only try to retrieve the logs in 1.2 format. */
efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(sys_table_arg);
}
Contributors
| Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp |
| Thiébaud Weksteen | 15 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |
| Total | 15 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |
Overall Contributors
| Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp |
| Thiébaud Weksteen | 305 | 62.24% | 1 | 33.33% |
| Matthew Garrett | 181 | 36.94% | 1 | 33.33% |
| Ard Biesheuvel | 4 | 0.82% | 1 | 33.33% |
| Total | 490 | 100.00% | 3 | 100.00% |
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