cregit-Linux how code gets into the kernel

Release 4.16 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

/*
 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
 *
 * Authors:
 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 * License.
 *
 * File: ima_main.c
 *      implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
 *      and ima_file_check.
 */
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>

#include "ima.h"


int ima_initialized;

#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE

int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
#else

int ima_appraise;
#endif


int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;

static int hash_setup_done;


static int __init hash_setup(char *str) { struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); int i; if (hash_setup_done) return 1; if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) { if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; else return 1; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) { ima_hash_algo = i; break; } } if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) return 1; out: hash_setup_done = 1; return 1; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar12589.29%250.00%
Boshi Wang139.29%125.00%
Dmitry Kasatkin21.43%125.00%
Total140100.00%4100.00%

__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); /* * ima_rdwr_violation_check * * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files: * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, * could result in a file measurement error. * */
static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int must_measure, char **pathbuf, const char **pathname, char *filename) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { if (!iint) iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags)) send_tomtou = true; } } else { if (must_measure) set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags); if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && must_measure) send_writers = true; } if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) return; *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename); if (send_tomtou) ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); if (send_writers) ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris7736.15%315.79%
Mimi Zohar4923.00%631.58%
Dmitry Kasatkin4621.60%421.05%
Roberto Sassu3717.37%526.32%
David Howells41.88%15.26%
Total213100.00%19100.00%


static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; bool update; if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) return; mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) { update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) || !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) || (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) { iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE); iint->measured_pcrs = 0; if (update) ima_update_xattr(iint, file); } } mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Dmitry Kasatkin4431.65%320.00%
Mimi Zohar3928.06%426.67%
Eric Paris3726.62%320.00%
Eric Richter64.32%16.67%
Sascha Hauer64.32%16.67%
Jeff Layton42.88%16.67%
Goffredo Baroncelli21.44%16.67%
Al Viro10.72%16.67%
Total139100.00%15100.00%

/** * ima_file_free - called on __fput() * @file: pointer to file structure being freed * * Flag files that changed, based on i_version */
void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return; ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar5488.52%457.14%
Al Viro34.92%114.29%
Eric Paris34.92%114.29%
Dmitry Kasatkin11.64%114.29%
Total61100.00%7100.00%


static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; char *pathbuf = NULL; char filename[NAME_MAX]; const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; bool violation_check; enum hash_algo hash_algo; if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0; /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) return 0; must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE; /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */ if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) func = FILE_CHECK; inode_lock(inode); if (action) { iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); if (!iint) rc = -ENOMEM; } if (!rc && violation_check) ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); inode_unlock(inode); if (rc) goto out; if (!action) goto out; mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */ iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */ iint->flags |= action; action &= IMA_DO_MASK; action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1); /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */ if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))) action ^= IMA_MEASURE; /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */ if ((action & IMA_HASH) && !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) { xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) && (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED; action ^= IMA_HASH; set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); } /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ if (!action) { if (must_appraise) rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func); goto out_locked; } template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) /* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) goto out_locked; if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); inode_unlock(inode); } if (action & IMA_AUDIT) ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) rc = 0; out_locked: if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) && !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) rc = -EACCES; mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); kfree(xattr_value); out: if (pathbuf) __putname(pathbuf); if (must_appraise) { if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); } return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar34844.67%1636.36%
Dmitry Kasatkin24931.96%1534.09%
Roberto Sassu10112.97%511.36%
Eric Richter395.01%36.82%
Eric Paris222.82%12.27%
Peter Moody131.67%12.27%
Al Viro40.51%24.55%
Miklos Szeredi30.39%12.27%
Total779100.00%44100.00%

/** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure() * policy decision. * * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0); return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar3683.72%360.00%
Dmitry Kasatkin716.28%240.00%
Total43100.00%5100.00%

/** * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure * * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write, * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file, * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access(). * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually * what is being executed. * * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar2589.29%250.00%
Dmitry Kasatkin310.71%250.00%
Total28100.00%4100.00%

/** * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND * * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision. * * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) { return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar3480.95%457.14%
Dmitry Kasatkin614.29%228.57%
Lans Zhang24.76%114.29%
Total42100.00%7100.00%

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); /** * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode * @dentry: newly created dentry * * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the * file data can be written later. */
void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) return; iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); if (iint) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar61100.00%1100.00%
Total61100.00%1100.00%

/** * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit * @read_id: caller identifier * * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of * a file requires a file descriptor. * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar4465.67%555.56%
Bruno E. O. Meneguele913.43%111.11%
Bruno E O Meneguele710.45%111.11%
Linus Torvalds45.97%111.11%
Dmitry Kasatkin34.48%111.11%
Total67100.00%9100.00%

static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK }; /** * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents * @size: size of in memory file contents * @read_id: caller identifier * * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules * are written in terms of a policy identifier. * * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */
int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ return 0; } if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ return 0; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) return 0; if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return -EACCES; return 0; } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar12590.58%583.33%
Christoph Hellwig139.42%116.67%
Total138100.00%6100.00%


static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; ima_init_template_list(); hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); error = ima_init(); if (!error) { ima_initialized = 1; ima_update_policy_flag(); } return error; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar3276.19%350.00%
Roberto Sassu511.90%116.67%
Dmitry Kasatkin511.90%233.33%
Total42100.00%6100.00%

late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

Overall Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Mimi Zohar108957.74%3437.36%
Dmitry Kasatkin37219.72%2325.27%
Roberto Sassu1437.58%77.69%
Eric Paris1397.37%77.69%
Eric Richter452.39%33.30%
Christoph Hellwig130.69%11.10%
Peter Moody130.69%11.10%
Boshi Wang130.69%11.10%
Bruno E. O. Meneguele90.48%11.10%
Al Viro80.42%33.30%
Jeff Layton70.37%11.10%
Bruno E O Meneguele70.37%11.10%
Sascha Hauer60.32%11.10%
Linus Torvalds40.21%11.10%
David Howells40.21%11.10%
Lans Zhang30.16%11.10%
Tejun Heo30.16%11.10%
James Morris30.16%11.10%
Miklos Szeredi30.16%11.10%
Goffredo Baroncelli20.11%11.10%
Total1886100.00%91100.00%
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