cregit-Linux how code gets into the kernel

Release 4.17 kernel/auditsc.c

Directory: kernel
/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
 *
 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
 * All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
 * (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 * GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
 *
 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
 *
 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
 *
 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
 *
 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
 * 2006.
 *
 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
 *
 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
 * filesystem information.
 *
 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
 */


#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt

#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>

#include "audit.h"

/* flags stating the success for a syscall */

#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0

#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1

#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2

/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */

#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500

/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */

#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128

/* number of audit rules */

int audit_n_rules;

/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */

int audit_signals;


struct audit_aux_data {
	
struct audit_aux_data	*next;
	
int			type;
};


#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM	0

/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */

#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS	16


struct audit_aux_data_pids {
	
struct audit_aux_data	d;
	
pid_t			target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
	
kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
	
kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
	
unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
	
u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
	
char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
	
int			pid_count;
};


struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
	
struct audit_aux_data	d;
	
struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
	
unsigned int		fcap_ver;
	
struct audit_cap_data	old_pcap;
	
struct audit_cap_data	new_pcap;
};


struct audit_tree_refs {
	
struct audit_tree_refs *next;
	
struct audit_chunk *c[31];
};


static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) { unsigned n; if (unlikely(!ctx)) return 0; n = ctx->major; switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { case 0: /* native */ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) return 1; if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) return 1; if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) return 1; return 0; case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) return 1; if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) return 1; if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) return 1; return 0; case 2: /* open */ return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); case 3: /* openat */ return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); case 4: /* socketcall */ return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); case 5: /* execve */ return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; default: return 0; } }

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PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro21188.66%228.57%
Eric Paris125.04%228.57%
zhangxiliang114.62%114.29%
Cordelia31.26%114.29%
David Woodhouse10.42%114.29%
Total238100.00%7100.00%


static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) { struct audit_names *n; umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; if (unlikely(!ctx)) return 0; list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) && ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) return 1; } return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro3444.74%233.33%
Eric Paris3242.11%233.33%
zhangxiliang911.84%116.67%
Richard Guy Briggs11.32%116.67%
Total76100.00%6100.00%

/* * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) { if (!ctx->prio) { ctx->prio = 1; ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; } }

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Eric Paris32100.00%1100.00%
Total32100.00%1100.00%


static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) { struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; int left = ctx->tree_count; if (likely(left)) { p->c[--left] = chunk; ctx->tree_count = left; return 1; } if (!p) return 0; p = p->next; if (p) { p->c[30] = chunk; ctx->trees = p; ctx->tree_count = 30; return 1; } return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro7469.16%225.00%
Amy Griffis1312.15%337.50%
Andrew Morton87.48%112.50%
Alexander Viro76.54%112.50%
David Woodhouse54.67%112.50%
Total107100.00%8100.00%


static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx->trees) { ctx->trees = p; return 0; } if (p) p->next = ctx->trees; else ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; ctx->tree_count = 31; return 1; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro7792.77%240.00%
Andrew Morton33.61%120.00%
Amy Griffis22.41%120.00%
Alexander Viro11.20%120.00%
Total83100.00%5100.00%

#endif
static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE struct audit_tree_refs *q; int n; if (!p) { /* we started with empty chain */ p = ctx->first_trees; count = 31; /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ if (!p) return; } n = count; for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { while (n--) { audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); q->c[n] = NULL; } } while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); q->c[n] = NULL; } ctx->trees = p; ctx->tree_count = count; #endif }

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Al Viro153100.00%1100.00%
Total153100.00%1100.00%


static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { q = p->next; kfree(p); } }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro46100.00%1100.00%
Total46100.00%1100.00%


static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE struct audit_tree_refs *p; int n; if (!tree) return 0; /* full ones */ for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) return 1; } /* partial */ if (p) { for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) return 1; } #endif return 0; }

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PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro132100.00%1100.00%
Total132100.00%1100.00%


static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, struct audit_names *name, struct audit_field *f, struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_names *n; int rc; if (name) { rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); if (rc) return rc; } if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); if (rc) return rc; } } return 0; }

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Eric W. Biedermann6463.37%125.00%
Eric Paris3736.63%375.00%
Total101100.00%4100.00%


static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, struct audit_names *name, struct audit_field *f, struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_names *n; int rc; if (name) { rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); if (rc) return rc; } if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); if (rc) return rc; } } return 0; }

Contributors

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Eric Paris5756.44%266.67%
Eric W. Biedermann4443.56%133.33%
Total101100.00%3100.00%


static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, struct audit_field *f, struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_names *name) { switch (f->val) { /* process to file object comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); /* uid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); /* auid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); /* euid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); /* suid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); /* gid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); /* egid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); /* sgid comparison */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); default: WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); return 0; } return 0; }

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Peter Moody40878.61%233.33%
Eric Paris8616.57%350.00%
Eric W. Biedermann254.82%116.67%
Total519100.00%6100.00%

/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 * otherwise. * * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_krule *rule, struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_names *name, enum audit_state *state, bool task_creation) { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; struct audit_names *n; int result = 0; pid_t pid; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PPID: if (ctx) { if (!ctx->ppid) ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk); result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); } break; case AUDIT_EXE: result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe); break; case AUDIT_UID: result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); break; case AUDIT_EUID: result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); break; case AUDIT_SUID: result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); break; case AUDIT_FSUID: result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); break; case AUDIT_GID: result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); if (f->op == Audit_equal) { if (!result) result = in_group_p(f->gid); } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { if (result) result = !in_group_p(f->gid); } break; case AUDIT_EGID: result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); if (f->op == Audit_equal) { if (!result) result = in_egroup_p(f->gid); } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { if (result) result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid); } break; case AUDIT_SGID: result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); break; case AUDIT_FSGID: result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); break; case AUDIT_SESSIONID: sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PERS: result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_ARCH: if (ctx) result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EXIT: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUCCESS: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { if (f->val) result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); else result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); } break; case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: if (name) { if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) ++result; } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } } } break; case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: if (name) { if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) ++result; } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } } } break; case AUDIT_INODE: if (name) result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val); else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } } } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: if (name) { result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { ++result; break; } } } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: if (name) { result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { ++result; break; } } } break; case AUDIT_WATCH: if (name) result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); break; case AUDIT_DIR: if (ctx) result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID: result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating a temporary error. We simply treat this as a match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { result = security_audit_rule_match( name->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } } } /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) ++result; } break; case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: if (ctx) result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: /* ignore this field for filtering */ result = 1; break; case AUDIT_PERM: result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FILETYPE: result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); break; } if (!result) return 0; } if (ctx) { if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) return 0; if (rule->filterkey) { kfree(ctx->filterkey); ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); } ctx->prio = rule->prio; } switch (rule->action) { case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; } return 1; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris27918.25%716.28%
Andrew Morton26217.14%12.33%
Al Viro25316.55%613.95%
Amy Griffis18812.30%49.30%
Darrel Goeddel16010.46%36.98%
Ilya V. Matveychikov986.41%12.33%
Richard Guy Briggs664.32%511.63%
Dustin Kirkland644.19%12.33%
Eric W. Biedermann483.14%24.65%
David Woodhouse452.94%36.98%
Steve Grubb191.24%12.33%
Tony Jones181.18%12.33%
David Howells140.92%24.65%
Ahmed S. Darwish110.72%36.98%
Chris Wright20.13%12.33%
zhangxiliang10.07%12.33%
Paul Moore10.07%12.33%
Total1529100.00%43100.00%

/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. */
static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) { struct audit_entry *e; enum audit_state state; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state, true)) { if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); rcu_read_unlock(); return state; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; }

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PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton4244.68%114.29%
Al Viro2526.60%114.29%
David Woodhouse2324.47%342.86%
Amy Griffis22.13%114.29%
Tony Jones22.13%114.29%
Total94100.00%7100.00%


static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) { int word, bit; if (val > 0xffffffff) return false; word = AUDIT_WORD(val); if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) return false; bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); return rule->mask[word] & bit; }

Contributors

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Andrew Lutomirski63100.00%1100.00%
Total63100.00%1100.00%

/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). */
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx, struct list_head *list) { struct audit_entry *e; enum audit_state state; if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) return AUDIT_DISABLED; rcu_read_lock(); if (!list_empty(list)) { list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, &state, false)) { rcu_read_unlock(); ctx->current_state = state; return state; } } } rcu_read_unlock(); return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
David Woodhouse4235.90%112.50%
Dustin Kirkland3328.21%112.50%
Andrew Morton2117.95%112.50%
Andrew Lutomirski86.84%112.50%
Al Viro65.13%112.50%
Paul Moore32.56%112.50%
Amy Griffis21.71%112.50%
Tony Jones21.71%112.50%
Total117100.00%8100.00%

/* * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash */
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *n, struct audit_context *ctx) { int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; struct audit_entry *e; enum audit_state state; if (list_empty(list)) return 0; list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { ctx->current_state = state; return 1; } } return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Amy Griffis6856.20%120.00%
Eric Paris3831.40%120.00%
Andrew Lutomirski86.61%120.00%
Al Viro54.13%120.00%
Tony Jones21.65%120.00%
Total121100.00%5100.00%

/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). */
void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) { struct audit_names *n; if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) return; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) break; } rcu_read_unlock(); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris4885.71%133.33%
Amy Griffis58.93%133.33%
Paul Moore35.36%133.33%
Total56100.00%3100.00%

/* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_valid, long return_code) { struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; if (!context) return NULL; context->return_valid = return_valid; /* * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific * signal handlers * * This is actually a test for: * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) * * but is faster than a bunch of || */ if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) context->return_code = -EINTR; else context->return_code = return_code; if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); } tsk->audit_context = NULL; return context; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton6552.42%112.50%
Eric Paris3326.61%112.50%
David Woodhouse1512.10%225.00%
Amy Griffis86.45%112.50%
Richard Guy Briggs10.81%112.50%
Al Viro10.81%112.50%
Paul Moore10.81%112.50%
Total124100.00%8100.00%


static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) { kfree(context->proctitle.value); context->proctitle.value = NULL; context->proctitle.len = 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
William Roberts37100.00%1100.00%
Total37100.00%1100.00%


static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) { struct audit_names *n, *next; list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { list_del(&n->list); if (n->name) putname(n->name); if (n->should_free) kfree(n); } context->name_count = 0; path_put(&context->pwd); context->pwd.dentry = NULL; context->pwd.mnt = NULL; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris3840.43%112.50%
Andrew Morton2728.72%112.50%
David Woodhouse2021.28%337.50%
Jan Blunck77.45%112.50%
Paul Moore11.06%112.50%
Dustin Kirkland11.06%112.50%
Total94100.00%8100.00%


static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) { struct audit_aux_data *aux; while ((aux = context->aux)) { context->aux = aux->next; kfree(aux); } while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { context->aux_pids = aux->next; kfree(aux); } }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
David Woodhouse4262.69%375.00%
Amy Griffis2537.31%125.00%
Total67100.00%4100.00%


static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) { struct audit_context *context; context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!context) return NULL; context->state = state; context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); return context; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton4558.44%233.33%
David Woodhouse1012.99%116.67%
Al Viro810.39%116.67%
Eric Paris810.39%116.67%
Rakib Mullick67.79%116.67%
Total77100.00%6100.00%

/** * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task * @tsk: task * * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is * needed. */
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_context *context; enum audit_state state; char *key = NULL; if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) { clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); return 0; } if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { kfree(key); audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); return -ENOMEM; } context->filterkey = key; tsk->audit_context = context; set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton8573.91%125.00%
Al Viro2017.39%125.00%
Oleg Nesterov97.83%125.00%
Eric Paris10.87%125.00%
Total115100.00%4100.00%


static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) { audit_free_names(context); unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); free_tree_refs(context); audit_free_aux(context); kfree(context->filterkey); kfree(context->sockaddr); audit_proctitle_free(context); kfree(context); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton2440.00%116.67%
Al Viro2135.00%233.33%
Amy Griffis711.67%116.67%
William Roberts58.33%116.67%
David Woodhouse35.00%116.67%
Total60100.00%6100.00%


static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, u32 sid, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; int rc = 0; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); if (!ab) return rc; audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); if (sid) { if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); rc = 1; } else { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } } audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); audit_log_end(ab); return rc; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris11668.64%228.57%
Dustin Kirkland2213.02%114.29%
David Woodhouse105.92%114.29%
Al Viro95.33%114.29%
Stephen D. Smalley95.33%114.29%
Ahmed S. Darwish31.78%114.29%
Total169100.00%7100.00%


static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab) { long len_max; long len_rem; long len_full; long len_buf; long len_abuf = 0; long len_tmp; bool require_data; bool encode; unsigned int iter; unsigned int arg; char *buf_head; char *buf; const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start; /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */ char abuf[96]; /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */ WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500); len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */ buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf_head) { audit_panic("out of memory for argv string"); return; } buf = buf_head; audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc); len_rem = len_max; len_buf = 0; len_full = 0; require_data = true; encode = false; iter = 0; arg = 0; do { /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything * serious, but the audit record format insists we * provide an argument length for really long arguments, * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for * recording in the log, although we don't use it * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */ if (len_full == 0) len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; /* read more data from userspace */ if (require_data) { /* can we make more room in the buffer? */ if (buf != buf_head) { memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf); buf = buf_head; } /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */ len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p, len_max - len_buf); if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) { /* unable to copy from userspace */ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); goto out; } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) { /* buffer is not large enough */ require_data = true; /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple * buffers force the encoding so we stand * a chance at a sane len_full value and * consistent record encoding */ encode = true; len_full = len_full * 2; p += len_tmp; } else { require_data = false; if (!encode) encode = audit_string_contains_control( buf, len_tmp); /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */ if (len_full < len_max) len_full = (encode ? len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp); p += len_tmp + 1; } len_buf += len_tmp; buf_head[len_buf] = '\0'; /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */ len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2); } /* write as much as we can to the audit log */ if (len_buf > 0) { /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with * a new buffer */ if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) { len_rem = len_max; audit_log_end(*ab); *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); if (!*ab) goto out; } /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */ len_tmp = 0; if (require_data || (iter > 0) || ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) { if (iter == 0) { len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, " a%d_len=%lu", arg, len_full); } len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++); } else len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, " a%d=", arg); WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf)); abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0'; /* log the arg in the audit record */ audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf); len_rem -= len_tmp; len_tmp = len_buf; if (encode) { if (len_abuf > len_rem) len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */ audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp); len_rem -= len_tmp * 2; len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2; } else { if (len_abuf > len_rem) len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */ audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp); len_rem -= len_tmp + 2; /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need * to add quotes to the remaining string */ len_abuf -= len_tmp; } len_buf -= len_tmp; buf += len_tmp; } /* ready to move to the next argument? */ if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) { arg++; iter = 0; len_full = 0; require_data = true; encode = false; } } while (arg < context->execve.argc); /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */ out: kfree(buf_head); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Paul Moore47567.19%15.88%
Eric Paris16523.34%529.41%
Peter Zijlstra253.54%211.76%
Al Viro152.12%317.65%
Amy Griffis91.27%15.88%
Peter Moody60.85%15.88%
Richard Guy Briggs50.71%211.76%
Stephen D. Smalley40.57%15.88%
Andrew Morton30.42%15.88%
Total707100.00%17100.00%


static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) { struct audit_buffer *ab; int i; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); if (!ab) return; switch (context->type) { case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, context->socketcall.args[i]); break; } case AUDIT_IPC: { u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode); if (osid) { char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); *call_panic = 1; } else { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } } if (context->ipc.has_perm) { audit_log_end(ab); ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_format(ab, "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", context->ipc.qbytes, context->ipc.perm_uid, context->ipc.perm_gid, context->ipc.perm_mode); } break; } case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); break; case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); break; case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", context->mq_notify.mqdes, context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); break; case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); break; } case AUDIT_CAPSET: audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient); break; case AUDIT_MMAP: audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, context->mmap.flags); break; case AUDIT_EXECVE: audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab); break; case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE: audit_log_format(ab, "name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name); kfree(context->module.name); break; } audit_log_end(ab); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris38963.25%28.00%
Al Viro9615.61%936.00%
Richard Guy Briggs599.59%312.00%
Andrew Morton457.32%14.00%
Kees Cook60.98%14.00%
Deepa Dinamani50.81%14.00%
Peter Zijlstra30.49%14.00%
Steve Grubb30.49%14.00%
Eric W. Biedermann30.49%14.00%
Jeff Layton20.33%14.00%
David Woodhouse20.33%28.00%
Chris Wright10.16%14.00%
Alan Cox10.16%14.00%
Total615100.00%25100.00%


static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) { char *end = proctitle + len - 1; while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end)) end--; /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */ len = end - proctitle + 1; len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0; return len; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
William Roberts66100.00%1100.00%
Total66100.00%1100.00%


static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *context) { int res; char *buf; char *msg = "(null)"; int len = strlen(msg); struct audit_buffer *ab; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE); if (!ab) return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */ audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle="); /* Not cached */ if (!context->proctitle.value) { buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) goto out; /* Historically called this from procfs naming */ res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN); if (res == 0) { kfree(buf); goto out; } res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res); if (res == 0) { kfree(buf); goto out; } context->proctitle.value = buf; context->proctitle.len = res; } msg = context->proctitle.value; len = context->proctitle.len; out: audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len); audit_log_end(ab); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
William Roberts197100.00%1100.00%
Total197100.00%1100.00%


static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) { int i, call_panic = 0; struct audit_buffer *ab; struct audit_aux_data *aux; struct audit_names *n; /* tsk == current */ context->personality = tsk->personality; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); if (!ab) return; /* audit_panic has been called */ audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", context->arch, context->major); if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); if (context->return_valid) audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", context->return_code); audit_log_format(ab, " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", context->argv[0], context->argv[1], context->argv[2], context->argv[3], context->name_count); audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); audit_log_end(ab); for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); if (!ab) continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ switch (aux->type) { case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient); audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient); break; } } audit_log_end(ab); } if (context->type) show_special(context, &call_panic); if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); if (ab) { audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); audit_log_end(ab); } } if (context->sockaddr_len) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); if (ab) { audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, context->sockaddr_len); audit_log_end(ab); } } for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], axs->target_sid[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; } if (context->target_pid && audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1; if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); if (ab) { audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); audit_log_end(ab); } } i = 0; list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (n->hidden) continue; audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); } audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); if (ab) audit_log_end(ab); if (call_panic) audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris53666.75%724.14%
Al Viro15719.55%724.14%
Richard Guy Briggs313.86%13.45%
Andrew Morton222.74%13.45%
Amy Griffis161.99%13.45%
David Woodhouse151.87%413.79%
Jeff Layton91.12%13.45%
William Roberts70.87%13.45%
Jan Blunck30.37%13.45%
Steve Grubb20.25%26.90%
Ahmed S. Darwish20.25%13.45%
Chris Wright20.25%13.45%
Stephen D. Smalley10.12%13.45%
Total803100.00%29100.00%

/** * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free * * Called from copy_process and do_exit */
void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_context *context; context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0); if (!context) return; /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this * in the context of the idle thread */ /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) audit_log_exit(context, tsk); if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); audit_free_context(context); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro5368.83%333.33%
Andrew Morton1215.58%111.11%
Amy Griffis911.69%222.22%
Eric Paris11.30%111.11%
Richard Guy Briggs11.30%111.11%
David Woodhouse11.30%111.11%
Total77100.00%9100.00%

/** * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry * @major: major syscall type (function) * @a1: additional syscall register 1 * @a2: additional syscall register 2 * @a3: additional syscall register 3 * @a4: additional syscall register 4 * * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it * be written). */
void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; enum audit_state state; if (!audit_enabled || !context) return; BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); state = context->state; if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) return; context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { context->prio = 0; if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) return; } context->arch = syscall_get_arch(); context->major = major; context->argv[0] = a1; context->argv[1] = a2; context->argv[2] = a3; context->argv[3] = a4; context->serial = 0; context->ctime = current_kernel_time64(); context->in_syscall = 1; context->current_state = state; context->ppid = 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro12163.35%216.67%
Richard Guy Briggs5227.23%325.00%
David Woodhouse63.14%216.67%
Roland McGrath42.09%18.33%
Mel Gorman31.57%18.33%
Steve Grubb31.57%18.33%
Andrew Morton10.52%18.33%
Eric Paris10.52%18.33%
Total191100.00%12100.00%

/** * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call * @success: success value of the syscall * @return_code: return value of the syscall * * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, * free the names stored from getname(). */
void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct audit_context *context; if (success) success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; else success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code); if (!context) return; if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) audit_log_exit(context, tsk); context->in_syscall = 0; context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); audit_free_names(context); unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); audit_free_aux(context); context->aux = NULL; context->aux_pids = NULL; context->target_pid = 0; context->target_sid = 0; context->sockaddr_len = 0; context->type = 0; context->fds[0] = -1; if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { kfree(context->filterkey); context->filterkey = NULL; } tsk->audit_context = context; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro11354.85%847.06%
Andrew Morton3918.93%15.88%
David Woodhouse2311.17%423.53%
Eric Paris167.77%15.88%
Stephen D. Smalley83.88%15.88%
Chris Wright62.91%15.88%
Richard Guy Briggs10.49%15.88%
Total206100.00%17100.00%


static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE struct audit_context *context; struct audit_tree_refs *p; struct audit_chunk *chunk; int count; if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) return; context = current->audit_context; p = context->trees; count = context->tree_count; rcu_read_lock(); chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); rcu_read_unlock(); if (!chunk) return; if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) return; if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); audit_set_auditable(context); audit_put_chunk(chunk); unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); return; } put_tree_ref(context, chunk); #endif }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro11580.99%225.00%
Andrew Morton2114.79%112.50%
Eric Paris21.41%225.00%
Chris Wright21.41%112.50%
Jan Kara10.70%112.50%
Richard Guy Briggs10.70%112.50%
Total142100.00%8100.00%


static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE struct audit_context *context; struct audit_tree_refs *p; const struct dentry *d, *parent; struct audit_chunk *drop; unsigned long seq; int count; context = current->audit_context; p = context->trees; count = context->tree_count; retry: drop = NULL; d = dentry; rcu_read_lock(); seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); for(;;) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d); if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) { struct audit_chunk *chunk; chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); if (chunk) { if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { drop = chunk; break; } } } parent = d->d_parent; if (parent == d) break; d = parent; } if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ rcu_read_unlock(); if (!drop) { /* just a race with rename */ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); goto retry; } audit_put_chunk(drop); if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { /* OK, got more space */ unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); goto retry; } /* too bad */ pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); audit_set_auditable(context); return; } rcu_read_unlock(); #endif }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro19875.00%323.08%
Andrew Morton4717.80%17.69%
Amy Griffis72.65%215.38%
David Woodhouse41.52%215.38%
David Howells31.14%17.69%
Eric Paris20.76%215.38%
Alexander Viro20.76%17.69%
Richard Guy Briggs10.38%17.69%
Total264100.00%13100.00%


static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, unsigned char type) { struct audit_names *aname; if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); } else { aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); if (!aname) return NULL; aname->should_free = true; } aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; aname->type = type; list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); context->name_count++; return aname; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris10990.83%133.33%
Jeff Layton108.33%133.33%
Richard Guy Briggs10.83%133.33%
Total120100.00%3100.00%

/** * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname * * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL. */
struct filename * __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct audit_names *n; list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (!n->name) continue; if (n->name->uptr == uptr) { n->name->refcnt++; return n->name; } } return NULL; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Jeff Layton6387.50%150.00%
Paul Moore912.50%150.00%
Total72100.00%2100.00%

/** * __audit_getname - add a name to the list * @name: name to add * * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct audit_names *n; if (!context->in_syscall) return; n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); if (!n) return; n->name = name; n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; name->aname = n; name->refcnt++; if (!context->pwd.dentry) get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton2830.77%17.69%
Eric Paris2426.37%17.69%
Jeff Layton1010.99%323.08%
David Woodhouse99.89%17.69%
Amy Griffis55.49%17.69%
Paul Moore55.49%17.69%
Jan Blunck44.40%215.38%
Miklos Szeredi33.30%17.69%
Chris Wright22.20%17.69%
Al Viro11.10%17.69%
Total91100.00%13100.00%

/** * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup * @name: name being audited * @dentry: dentry being audited * @flags: attributes for this particular entry */
void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct audit_names *n; bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; if (!context->in_syscall) return; if (!name) goto out_alloc; /* * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can * just use it directly if the type is correct. */ n = name->aname; if (n) { if (parent) { if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) goto out; } else { if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) goto out; } } list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (n->ino) { /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */ if (n->ino != inode->i_ino || n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev) continue; } else if (n->name) { /* inode number has not been set, check the name */ if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name)) continue; } else /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */ continue; /* match the correct record type */ if (parent) { if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) goto out; } else { if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) goto out; } } out_alloc: /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */ n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); if (!n) return; if (name) { n->name = name; name->refcnt++; } out: if (parent) { n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN) n->hidden = true; } else { n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; } handle_path(dentry); audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Jeff Layton16449.25%630.00%
Paul Moore6318.92%420.00%
Eric Paris3911.71%210.00%
Andrew Morton3610.81%15.00%
Al Viro103.00%210.00%
Dustin Kirkland72.10%15.00%
David Woodhouse61.80%15.00%
David Howells30.90%15.00%
Linus Torvalds30.90%15.00%
Amy Griffis20.60%15.00%
Total333100.00%20100.00%


void __audit_file(const struct file *file) { __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro24100.00%1100.00%
Total24100.00%1100.00%

/** * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects * @parent: inode of dentry parent * @dentry: dentry being audited * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for * * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during * unsuccessful attempts. */
void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; struct audit_entry *e; struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; int i; if (!context->in_syscall) return; rcu_read_lock(); if (!list_empty(list)) { list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) { if (audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, f->op, f->val)) { if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { rcu_read_unlock(); return; } } } } } } rcu_read_unlock(); if (inode) handle_one(inode); /* look for a parent entry first */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (!n->name || (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) continue; if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev && !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) { if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; found_parent = n; break; } } /* is there a matching child entry? */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { /* can only match entries that have a name */ if (!n->name || (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) continue; if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) || !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, found_parent ? found_parent->name_len : AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) n->type = type; found_child = n; break; } } if (!found_parent) { /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); if (!n) return; audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); } if (!found_child) { found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); if (!found_child) return; /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in * audit_free_names() */ if (found_parent) { found_child->name = found_parent->name; found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; found_child->name->refcnt++; } } if (inode) audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); else found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Richard Guy Briggs12725.92%27.69%
Amy Griffis12325.10%623.08%
Jeff Layton8016.33%623.08%
Paul Moore5310.82%27.69%
Eric Paris397.96%27.69%
Andrew Morton275.51%13.85%
Al Viro275.51%311.54%
Steve Grubb51.02%13.85%
Chris Wright40.82%13.85%
David Howells30.61%13.85%
David Woodhouse20.41%13.85%
Total490100.00%26100.00%

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); /** * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values * @ctx: audit_context for the task * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context * * Also sets the context as auditable. */
int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial) { if (!ctx->in_syscall) return 0; if (!ctx->serial) ctx->serial = audit_serial(); t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; *serial = ctx->serial; if (!ctx->prio) { ctx->prio = 1; ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; } return 1; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Andrew Morton4850.53%114.29%
Al Viro3031.58%228.57%
David Woodhouse1515.79%228.57%
Steve Grubb11.05%114.29%
Deepa Dinamani11.05%114.29%
Total95100.00%7100.00%

/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid) { /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */ if (!audit_loginuid_set(current)) return 0; /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE)) return -EPERM; /* it is set, you need permission */ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) return -EPERM; /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid)) return -EPERM; return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris5786.36%562.50%
Andrew Morton57.58%112.50%
Eric W. Biedermann46.06%225.00%
Total66100.00%8100.00%


static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid, int rc) { struct audit_buffer *ab; uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; struct tty_struct *tty; if (!audit_enabled) return; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); if (!ab) return; uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), tty = audit_get_tty(current); audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid); audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); audit_put_tty(tty); audit_log_end(ab); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris7647.80%426.67%
Richard Guy Briggs5333.33%426.67%
Steve Grubb148.81%16.67%
Gao Feng63.77%16.67%
Serge E. Hallyn53.14%16.67%
Eric W. Biedermann21.26%16.67%
Chris Wright10.63%16.67%
Paul Moore10.63%16.67%
Andrew Morton10.63%16.67%
Total159100.00%15100.00%

/** * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid * @loginuid: loginuid value * * Returns 0. * * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). */
int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) { struct task_struct *task = current; unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1; kuid_t oldloginuid; int rc; oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid); if (rc) goto out; /* are we setting or clearing? */ if (uid_valid(loginuid)) { sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); if (unlikely(sessionid == (unsigned int)-1)) sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); } task->sessionid = sessionid; task->loginuid = loginuid; out: audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc); return rc; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris11582.14%562.50%
Richard Guy Briggs1611.43%112.50%
Andrew Morton85.71%112.50%
Al Viro10.71%112.50%
Total140100.00%8100.00%

/** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag * @mode: mode bits * @attr: queue attributes * */
void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; if (attr) memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); else memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; context->mq_open.mode = mode; context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
George C. Wilson6573.86%133.33%
Al Viro2326.14%266.67%
Total88100.00%3100.00%

/** * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive * @mqdes: MQ descriptor * @msg_len: Message length * @msg_prio: Message priority * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time * */
void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; if (abs_timeout) memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p)); else memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
George C. Wilson7269.90%133.33%
Al Viro2524.27%133.33%
Deepa Dinamani65.83%133.33%
Total103100.00%3100.00%

/** * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify * @mqdes: MQ descriptor * @notification: Notification event * */
void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; if (notification) context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; else context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
George C. Wilson4371.67%150.00%
Al Viro1728.33%150.00%
Total60100.00%2100.00%

/** * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute * @mqdes: MQ descriptor * @mqstat: MQ flags * */
void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
George C. Wilson3884.44%150.00%
Al Viro715.56%150.00%
Total45100.00%2100.00%

/** * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object * @ipcp: ipc permissions * */
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm = 0; security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); context->type = AUDIT_IPC; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Steve Grubb5168.00%120.00%
Al Viro2330.67%360.00%
Ahmed S. Darwish11.33%120.00%
Total75100.00%5100.00%

/** * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions * @qbytes: msgq bytes * @uid: msgq user id * @gid: msgq group id * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) * * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). */
void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; context->ipc.has_perm = 1; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
David Woodhouse4465.67%120.00%
Al Viro2232.84%360.00%
Dustin Kirkland11.49%120.00%
Total67100.00%5100.00%


void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE; context->execve.argc = bprm->argc; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro2674.29%133.33%
Richard Guy Briggs822.86%133.33%
Eric Paris12.86%133.33%
Total35100.00%3100.00%

/** * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS. * @args: args array * */
int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) return -EINVAL; context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
David Woodhouse4357.33%125.00%
Chen Gang S2128.00%125.00%
Al Viro1013.33%125.00%
Eric Paris11.33%125.00%
Total75100.00%4100.00%

/** * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair * @fd1: the first file descriptor * @fd2: the second file descriptor * */
void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->fds[0] = fd1; context->fds[1] = fd2; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro38100.00%2100.00%
Total38100.00%2100.00%

/** * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto * @len: data length in user space * @a: data address in kernel space * * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. */
int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; if (!context->sockaddr) { void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; context->sockaddr = p; } context->sockaddr_len = len; memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
David Woodhouse5467.50%133.33%
Al Viro2531.25%133.33%
Eric Paris11.25%133.33%
Total80100.00%3100.00%


void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris3747.44%228.57%
Al Viro3443.59%114.29%
David Howells33.85%114.29%
Richard Guy Briggs22.56%114.29%
Ahmed S. Darwish11.28%114.29%
Paul Moore11.28%114.29%
Total78100.00%7100.00%

/** * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem * @sig: signal value * @t: task being signaled * * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) * and uid that is doing that. */
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) { audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly * in audit_context */ if (!ctx->target_pid) { ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!axp) return -ENOMEM; axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; } BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t); axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Amy Griffis17347.40%15.88%
Eric Paris9626.30%317.65%
Steve Grubb3910.68%15.88%
Al Viro195.21%317.65%
David Howells143.84%15.88%
Paul Moore82.19%317.65%
Richard Guy Briggs82.19%15.88%
Eric W. Biedermann41.10%211.76%
Ahmed S. Darwish30.82%15.88%
Adrian Bunk10.27%15.88%
Total365100.00%17100.00%

/** * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed * @new: the proposed new credentials * @old: the old credentials * * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall * * -Eric */
int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ax) return -ENOMEM; ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; ax->d.next = context->aux; context->aux = (void *)ax; get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient; ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient; return 0; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris18377.22%116.67%
David Howells3012.66%233.33%
Richard Guy Briggs208.44%116.67%
Al Viro41.69%233.33%
Total237100.00%6100.00%

/** * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall * @new: the new credentials * @old: the old (current) credentials * * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the * audit system if applicable */
void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient; context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris4145.05%116.67%
David Howells1718.68%116.67%
Al Viro1718.68%116.67%
Richard Guy Briggs1213.19%116.67%
Eric W. Biedermann33.30%116.67%
Paul Moore11.10%116.67%
Total91100.00%6100.00%


void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->mmap.fd = fd; context->mmap.flags = flags; context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro42100.00%1100.00%
Total42100.00%1100.00%


void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; context->module.name = kmalloc(strlen(name) + 1, GFP_KERNEL); strcpy(context->module.name, name); context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Richard Guy Briggs53100.00%1100.00%
Total53100.00%1100.00%


void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) { audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Steve Grubb24100.00%1100.00%
Total24100.00%1100.00%


static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) { kuid_t auid, uid; kgid_t gid; unsigned int sessionid; char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), sessionid); audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current)); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris3930.47%218.18%
Steve Grubb2620.31%19.09%
Eric W. Biedermann2015.62%19.09%
Richard Guy Briggs1814.06%218.18%
David Howells1310.16%19.09%
Paul Davies C75.47%19.09%
Kees Cook21.56%19.09%
Davidlohr Bueso A21.56%19.09%
Paul Moore10.78%19.09%
Total128100.00%11100.00%

/** * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally * @signr: signal value * * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we * should record the event for investigation. */
void audit_core_dumps(long signr) { struct audit_buffer *ab; if (!audit_enabled) return; if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ return; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_task(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr); audit_log_end(ab); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris3857.58%116.67%
Steve Grubb1116.67%233.33%
Kees Cook913.64%116.67%
Paul Davies C69.09%116.67%
Ahmed S. Darwish23.03%116.67%
Total66100.00%6100.00%


void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { struct audit_buffer *ab; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_task(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x", signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code); audit_log_end(ab); }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Kees Cook3445.95%233.33%
Eric Paris2128.38%116.67%
Steve Grubb1520.27%116.67%
Richard Guy Briggs34.05%116.67%
Andrew Lutomirski11.35%116.67%
Total74100.00%6100.00%


struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) { struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) return NULL; return &ctx->killed_trees; }

Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Al Viro40100.00%1100.00%
Total40100.00%1100.00%


Overall Contributors

PersonTokensPropCommitsCommitProp
Eric Paris293125.86%4016.74%
Al Viro245221.63%4317.99%
Andrew Morton9498.37%20.84%
Amy Griffis7036.20%114.60%
Paul Moore6365.61%93.77%
Richard Guy Briggs5514.86%229.21%
David Woodhouse4754.19%187.53%
Peter Moody4143.65%31.26%
Jeff Layton3403.00%114.60%
William Roberts3202.82%10.42%
George C. Wilson2221.96%10.42%
Eric W. Biedermann2191.93%52.09%
Steve Grubb2131.88%125.02%
Darrel Goeddel1601.41%31.26%
Dustin Kirkland1301.15%31.26%
David Howells1010.89%52.09%
Ilya V. Matveychikov980.86%10.42%
Andrew Lutomirski800.71%20.84%
Kees Cook540.48%31.26%
Peter Zijlstra280.25%31.26%
Tony Jones250.22%10.42%
Stephen D. Smalley250.22%20.84%
Ahmed S. Darwish230.20%31.26%
zhangxiliang210.19%20.84%
Chen Gang S210.19%10.42%
Chris Wright200.18%31.26%
Jan Blunck140.12%20.84%
Deepa Dinamani130.11%20.84%
Paul Davies C130.11%20.84%
Alexander Viro100.09%10.42%
Oleg Nesterov90.08%10.42%
Geliang Tang90.08%10.42%
Rakib Mullick60.05%10.42%
Gao Feng60.05%10.42%
Serge E. Hallyn50.04%10.42%
Trond Myklebust50.04%10.42%
Jan Kara40.04%10.42%
Randy Dunlap40.04%20.84%
Roland McGrath40.04%10.42%
Linus Torvalds30.03%10.42%
Mel Gorman30.03%10.42%
Tejun Heo30.03%10.42%
Cordelia30.03%10.42%
Miklos Szeredi30.03%10.42%
Alan Cox20.02%20.84%
Davidlohr Bueso A20.02%10.42%
Paul Gortmaker10.01%10.42%
Masanari Iida10.01%10.42%
Adrian Bunk10.01%10.42%
Arun Sharma10.01%10.42%
Andreas Gruenbacher0.00%00.00%
Total11336100.00%239100.00%
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