Directory: crypto

/* * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter -- * Jitter RNG standalone code. * * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 * * Design * ====== * * See http://www.chronox.de/jent.html * * License * ======= * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, * including the disclaimer of warranties. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior * written permission. * * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH * DAMAGE. */ /* * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library * version 1.1.0 provided at http://www.chronox.de/jent.html */ #ifdef __OPTIMIZE__ #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c." #endif typedef unsigned long long __u64; typedef long long __s64; typedef unsigned int __u32; #define NULL ((void *) 0) /* The entropy pool */ struct rand_data { /* all data values that are vital to maintain the security * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to * calculate the next random value. */ __u64 data; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */ __u64 old_data; /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */ __u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */ #define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8) __u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */ __s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */ unsigned int stuck:1; /* Time measurement stuck */ unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */ unsigned int stir:1; /* Post-processing stirring */ unsigned int disable_unbias:1; /* Deactivate Von-Neuman unbias */ #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64 #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32 #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128 #define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE) unsigned char *mem; /* Memory access location with size of * memblocks * memblocksize */ unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */ unsigned int memblocks; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */ unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */ unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random * bit generation */ }; /* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */ #define JENT_DISABLE_STIR (1<<0) /* Disable stirring the entropy pool */ #define JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS (1<<1) /* Disable the Von-Neuman Unbiaser */ #define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for * entropy collector */ /* -- error codes for init function -- */ #define JENT_ENOTIME 1 /* Timer service not available */ #define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */ #define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */ #define JENT_EMINVARIATION 4 /* Timer variations too small for RNG */ #define JENT_EVARVAR 5 /* Timer does not produce variations of * variations (2nd derivation of time is * zero). */ #define JENT_EMINVARVAR 6 /* Timer variations of variations is tooi * small. */ /*************************************************************************** * Helper functions ***************************************************************************/ void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out); __u64 jent_rol64(__u64 word, unsigned int shift); void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len); void jent_zfree(void *ptr); int jent_fips_enabled(void); void jent_panic(char *s); void jent_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, unsigned int n); /** * Update of the loop count used for the next round of * an entropy collection. * * Input: * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at * the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value * * @return Newly calculated loop counter */

static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int bits, unsigned int min) { __u64 time = 0; __u64 shuffle = 0; unsigned int i = 0; unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1; jent_get_nstime(&time); /* * mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more */ if (ec) time ^= ec->data; /* * we fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many * bits of the time stamp are included as possible */ for (i = 0; (DATA_SIZE_BITS / bits) > i; i++) { shuffle ^= time & mask; time = time >> bits; } /* * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum * RNG loop count. */ return (shuffle + (1<<min)); }## Contributors

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 108 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 108 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

/*************************************************************************** * Noise sources ***************************************************************************/ /** * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU * execution time jitter * * This function folds the time into one bit units by iterating * through the DATA_SIZE_BITS bit time value as follows: assume our time value * is 0xabcd * 1st loop, 1st shift generates 0xd000 * 1st loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000d * 2nd loop, 1st shift generates 0xcd00 * 2nd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000c * 3rd loop, 1st shift generates 0xbcd0 * 3rd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000b * 4th loop, 1st shift generates 0xabcd * 4th loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000a * Now, the values at the end of the 2nd shifts are XORed together. * * The code is deliberately inefficient and shall stay that way. This function * is the root cause why the code shall be compiled without optimization. This * function not only acts as folding operation, but this function's execution * is used to measure the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in * this function implies that careful retesting must be done. * * Input: * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL * @time time stamp to be folded * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of * loops to perform the folding * * Output: * @folded result of folding operation * * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed */

static __u64 jent_fold_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 *folded, __u64 loop_cnt) { unsigned int i; __u64 j = 0; __u64 new = 0; #define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4 #define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0 __u64 fold_loop_cnt = jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); /* * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not * needed during runtime */ if (loop_cnt) fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) { new = 0; for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) { __u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i); tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1); new ^= tmp; } } *folded = new; return fold_loop_cnt; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 133 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 133 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

/** * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in * memory access times * * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. * * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses. * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However, * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite * large which is usually not desirable. * * Input: * @ec Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if * the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise * source is disabled * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of * loops to perform the folding * * @return Number of memory access operations */

static unsigned int jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt) { unsigned char *tmpval = NULL; unsigned int wrap = 0; __u64 i = 0; #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0 __u64 acc_loop_cnt = jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) return 0; wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks; /* * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not * needed during runtime */ if (loop_cnt) acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) { tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation; /* * memory access: just add 1 to one byte, * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read * from and write to memory location */ *tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff; /* * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer * with wrap around logic to ensure that every * memory location is hit evenly */ ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1; ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap; } return i; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 159 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 159 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

/*************************************************************************** * Start of entropy processing logic ***************************************************************************/ /** * Stuck test by checking the: * 1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta) * 2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) * 3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas) * * All values must always be non-zero. * * Input: * @ec Reference to entropy collector * @current_delta Jitter time delta * * @return * 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit) * 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit) */

static void jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta) { __s64 delta2 = ec->last_delta - current_delta; __s64 delta3 = delta2 - ec->last_delta2; ec->last_delta = current_delta; ec->last_delta2 = delta2; if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) ec->stuck = 1; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 61 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 61 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

/** * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is folded into one * bit. You can call this function the "random bit generator" as it * produces one random bit per invocation. * * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output * of this function! This can be done by calling this function * and not using its result. * * Input: * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector * * @return One random bit */

static __u64 jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec) { __u64 time = 0; __u64 data = 0; __u64 current_delta = 0; /* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */ jent_memaccess(ec, 0); /* * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous * invocation to measure the timing variations */ jent_get_nstime(&time); current_delta = time - ec->prev_time; ec->prev_time = time; /* Now call the next noise sources which also folds the data */ jent_fold_time(ec, current_delta, &data, 0); /* * Check whether we have a stuck measurement. The enforcement * is performed after the stuck value has been mixed into the * entropy pool. */ jent_stuck(ec, current_delta); return data; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 79 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 79 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

/** * Von Neuman unbias as explained in RFC 4086 section 4.2. As shown in the * documentation of that RNG, the bits from jent_measure_jitter are considered * independent which implies that the Von Neuman unbias operation is applicable. * A proof of the Von-Neumann unbias operation to remove skews is given in the * document "A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number * generators", version 2.0 by Werner Schindler, section 5.4.1. * * Input: * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector * * @return One random bit */

static __u64 jent_unbiased_bit(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) { do { __u64 a = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector); __u64 b = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector); if (a == b) continue; if (1 == a) return 1; else return 0; } while (1); }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 55 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 55 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

/** * Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function (XOR) * into the pool. * * The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and the * location of the set bits in the random number generated by the entropy * source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this mixer value * can have 2**64 different values. That mixer value is initialized with the * first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the mixer value, it is XORed into * the random number. * * The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the XOR * operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the entropy pool. * * Input: * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector */

static void jent_stir_pool(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) { /* * to shut up GCC on 32 bit, we have to initialize the 64 variable * with two 32 bit variables */ union c { __u64 u64; __u32 u32[2]; }; /* * This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization * vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1 */ union c constant; /* * The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third * and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in * FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1 */ union c mixer; unsigned int i = 0; /* * Store the SHA-1 constants in reverse order to make up the 64 bit * value -- this applies to a little endian system, on a big endian * system, it reverses as expected. But this really does not matter * as we do not rely on the specific numbers. We just pick the SHA-1 * constants as they have a good mix of bit set and unset. */ constant.u32[1] = 0x67452301; constant.u32[0] = 0xefcdab89; mixer.u32[1] = 0x98badcfe; mixer.u32[0] = 0x10325476; for (i = 0; i < DATA_SIZE_BITS; i++) { /* * get the i-th bit of the input random number and only XOR * the constant into the mixer value when that bit is set */ if ((entropy_collector->data >> i) & 1) mixer.u64 ^= constant.u64; mixer.u64 = jent_rol64(mixer.u64, 1); } entropy_collector->data ^= mixer.u64; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 136 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 136 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

/** * Generator of one 64 bit random number * Function fills rand_data->data * * Input: * @ec Reference to entropy collector */

static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec) { unsigned int k = 0; /* priming of the ->prev_time value */ jent_measure_jitter(ec); while (1) { __u64 data = 0; if (ec->disable_unbias == 1) data = jent_measure_jitter(ec); else data = jent_unbiased_bit(ec); /* enforcement of the jent_stuck test */ if (ec->stuck) { /* * We only mix in the bit considered not appropriate * without the LSFR. The reason is that if we apply * the LSFR and we do not rotate, the 2nd bit with LSFR * will cancel out the first LSFR application on the * bad bit. * * And we do not rotate as we apply the next bit to the * current bit location again. */ ec->data ^= data; ec->stuck = 0; continue; } /* * Fibonacci LSFR with polynom of * x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is * primitive according to * http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf * (the shift values are the polynom values minus one * due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current * position is always the LSB, the polynom only needs * to shift data in from the left without wrap. */ ec->data ^= data; ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 63) & 1); ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 60) & 1); ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 55) & 1); ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 30) & 1); ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 27) & 1); ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 22) & 1); ec->data = jent_rol64(ec->data, 1); /* * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the * oversampling rate requested by the caller */ if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr)) break; } if (ec->stir) jent_stir_pool(ec); }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 222 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 222 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

/** * The continuous test required by FIPS 140-2 -- the function automatically * primes the test if needed. * * Return: * 0 if FIPS test passed * < 0 if FIPS test failed */

static void jent_fips_test(struct rand_data *ec) { if (!jent_fips_enabled()) return; /* prime the FIPS test */ if (!ec->old_data) { ec->old_data = ec->data; jent_gen_entropy(ec); } if (ec->data == ec->old_data) jent_panic("jitterentropy: Duplicate output detected\n"); ec->old_data = ec->data; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 64 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 64 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

/** * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller. * * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic * creates 64 bit per invocation. * * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact * size specified by the caller. * * Input: * @ec Reference to entropy collector * @data pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already * exist * @len size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random * in bytes * * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error * * The following error codes can occur: * -1 entropy_collector is NULL */

int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data, unsigned int len) { unsigned char *p = data; if (!ec) return -1; while (0 < len) { unsigned int tocopy; jent_gen_entropy(ec); jent_fips_test(ec); if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len) tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); else tocopy = len; jent_memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); len -= tocopy; p += tocopy; } return 0; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 103 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 103 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

/*************************************************************************** * Initialization logic ***************************************************************************/

struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags) { struct rand_data *entropy_collector; entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data)); if (!entropy_collector) return NULL; if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory * access */ entropy_collector->mem = jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); if (!entropy_collector->mem) { jent_zfree(entropy_collector); return NULL; } entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS; entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; } /* verify and set the oversampling rate */ if (0 == osr) osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */ entropy_collector->osr = osr; entropy_collector->stir = 1; if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_STIR) entropy_collector->stir = 0; if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS) entropy_collector->disable_unbias = 1; /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */ jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector); return entropy_collector; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 152 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 152 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) { jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem); entropy_collector->mem = NULL; jent_zfree(entropy_collector); entropy_collector = NULL; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 32 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 32 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

int jent_entropy_init(void) { int i; __u64 delta_sum = 0; __u64 old_delta = 0; int time_backwards = 0; int count_var = 0; int count_mod = 0; /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce * false positives. * * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus, * no statistical tests. */ /* * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution * timer. */ /* * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is * definitely too little. */ #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 300 #define CLEARCACHE 100 for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) { __u64 time = 0; __u64 time2 = 0; __u64 folded = 0; __u64 delta = 0; unsigned int lowdelta = 0; jent_get_nstime(&time); jent_fold_time(NULL, time, &folded, 1<<MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); jent_get_nstime(&time2); /* test whether timer works */ if (!time || !time2) return JENT_ENOTIME; delta = time2 - time; /* * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this * implies that we also have a high resolution timer */ if (!delta) return JENT_ECOARSETIME; /* * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case * measurements. */ if (CLEARCACHE > i) continue; /* test whether we have an increasing timer */ if (!(time2 > time)) time_backwards++; /* * Avoid modulo of 64 bit integer to allow code to compile * on 32 bit architectures. */ lowdelta = time2 - time; if (!(lowdelta % 100)) count_mod++; /* * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime * the old_data value */ if (i) { if (delta != old_delta) count_var++; if (delta > old_delta) delta_sum += (delta - old_delta); else delta_sum += (old_delta - delta); } old_delta = delta; } /* * we allow up to three times the time running backwards. * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus, * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being * performed during our test run. */ if (3 < time_backwards) return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC; /* Error if the time variances are always identical */ if (!delta_sum) return JENT_EVARVAR; /* * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation * implied with 1 is preserved */ if (delta_sum <= 1) return JENT_EMINVARVAR; /* * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter * increments in multiples of 100, but not always */ if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod) return JENT_ECOARSETIME; return 0; }

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 275 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Total | 275 | 100.00% | 1 | 100.00% |

Person | Tokens | Prop | Commits | CommitProp | |

stephan mueller | stephan mueller | 1836 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Total | 1836 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

Directory: crypto

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