Contributors: 37
| Author |
Tokens |
Token Proportion |
Commits |
Commit Proportion |
| David Howells |
1617 |
61.13% |
25 |
31.25% |
| Eric W. Biedermann |
282 |
10.66% |
8 |
10.00% |
| Neil Brown |
239 |
9.04% |
3 |
3.75% |
| Alexey Gladkov |
170 |
6.43% |
3 |
3.75% |
| Andrew Morton |
45 |
1.70% |
4 |
5.00% |
| Serge E. Hallyn |
36 |
1.36% |
2 |
2.50% |
| Mateusz Guzik |
36 |
1.36% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Linus Torvalds |
34 |
1.29% |
2 |
2.50% |
| James Morris |
30 |
1.13% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Jens Axboe |
26 |
0.98% |
2 |
2.50% |
| Seth Forshee |
22 |
0.83% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Alexey Dobriyan |
13 |
0.49% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Kees Cook |
12 |
0.45% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Chris Wright |
9 |
0.34% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Tetsuo Handa |
9 |
0.34% |
1 |
1.25% |
| tiozhang |
7 |
0.26% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Pavel Emelyanov |
6 |
0.23% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Yang Yingliang |
6 |
0.23% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman |
5 |
0.19% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Linus Torvalds (pre-git) |
5 |
0.19% |
2 |
2.50% |
| Ingo Molnar |
5 |
0.19% |
2 |
2.50% |
| Nadia Yvette Chambers |
4 |
0.15% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Al Viro |
3 |
0.11% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Shakeel Butt |
3 |
0.11% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Matt Helsley |
3 |
0.11% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Eric Paris |
3 |
0.11% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Dave Jones |
2 |
0.08% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Joe Perches |
2 |
0.08% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Thomas Gleixner |
2 |
0.08% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Vladimir Davydov |
2 |
0.08% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Rasmus Villemoes |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Paul Gortmaker |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Jann Horn |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Kunwu Chan |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Elena Reshetova |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Vasiliy Kulikov |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Motohiro Kosaki |
1 |
0.04% |
1 |
1.25% |
| Total |
2645 |
|
80 |
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.rst
*
* Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "CRED: " fmt
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#if 0
#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \
current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#else
#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
do { \
if (0) \
no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \
current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
#endif
static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
static struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(2) };
/*
* The initial credentials for the initial task
*/
struct cred init_cred = {
.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.suid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.sgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.euid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.egid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
.cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET,
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
.cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET,
.cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET,
.user = INIT_USER,
.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
.group_info = &init_groups,
.ucounts = &init_ucounts,
};
/*
* The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
*/
static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
if (atomic_long_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %ld\n",
cred, atomic_long_read(&cred->usage));
security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->session_keyring);
key_put(cred->process_keyring);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
if (cred->group_info)
put_group_info(cred->group_info);
free_uid(cred->user);
if (cred->ucounts)
put_ucounts(cred->ucounts);
put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
}
/**
* __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
* @cred: The record to release
*
* Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
*/
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%ld})", cred,
atomic_long_read(&cred->usage));
BUG_ON(atomic_long_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
if (cred->non_rcu)
put_cred_rcu(&cred->rcu);
else
call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
/*
* Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
*/
void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct cred *real_cred, *cred;
kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%ld})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
atomic_long_read(&tsk->cred->usage));
real_cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
tsk->real_cred = NULL;
cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
tsk->cred = NULL;
if (real_cred == cred) {
put_cred_many(cred, 2);
} else {
put_cred(real_cred);
put_cred(cred);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
key_put(tsk->cached_requested_key);
tsk->cached_requested_key = NULL;
#endif
}
/**
* get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
* @task: The task to query
*
* Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
* away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
*
* The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
* ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
*/
const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
{
const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
do {
cred = __task_cred((task));
BUG_ON(!cred);
} while (!get_cred_rcu(cred));
rcu_read_unlock();
return cred;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_cred);
/*
* Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
* later date without risk of ENOMEM.
*/
struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
{
struct cred *new;
new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
atomic_long_set(&new->usage, 1);
if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
goto error;
return new;
error:
abort_creds(new);
return NULL;
}
/**
* prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*
* Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
* shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
* prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
* calling commit_creds().
*
* Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
*
* Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
*/
struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
old = task->cred;
memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
new->non_rcu = 0;
atomic_long_set(&new->usage, 1);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);
get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
key_get(new->session_keyring);
key_get(new->process_keyring);
key_get(new->thread_keyring);
key_get(new->request_key_auth);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
new->security = NULL;
#endif
new->ucounts = get_ucounts(new->ucounts);
if (!new->ucounts)
goto error;
if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
goto error;
return new;
error:
abort_creds(new);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
/*
* Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
* - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
*/
struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
{
struct cred *new;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return new;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
/* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
key_put(new->process_keyring);
new->process_keyring = NULL;
#endif
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
return new;
}
/*
* Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
*
* We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
* set.
*
* The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
* objective and subjective credentials
*/
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
p->cached_requested_key = NULL;
#endif
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred_many(p->cred, 2);
kdebug("share_creds(%p{%ld})",
p->cred, atomic_long_read(&p->cred->usage));
inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
return 0;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
ret = create_user_ns(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
ret = set_cred_ucounts(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
* had one */
if (new->thread_keyring) {
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
/* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process;
* anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit.
*/
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
key_put(new->process_keyring);
new->process_keyring = NULL;
}
#endif
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
return 0;
error_put:
put_cred(new);
return ret;
}
static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
{
const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns;
const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns;
/* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if
* the capabilities of subset are a subset of set.
*/
if (set_ns == subset_ns)
return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted);
/* The credentials are in a different user namespaces
* therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an
* ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one
* of subsets ancestors.
*/
for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent) &&
uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
*
* Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
* the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
* updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
* in an overridden state.
*
* This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
*
* Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
* of, say, sys_setgid().
*/
int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%ld})", new,
atomic_long_read(&new->usage));
BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
BUG_ON(atomic_long_read(&new->usage) < 1);
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
!gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
!uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
!gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
!cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
/*
* If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable,
* the dumpability change must become visible before
* the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access()
* racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it
* shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped
* privileges without becoming nondumpable).
* Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access().
*/
smp_wmb();
}
/* alter the thread keyring */
if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
key_fsuid_changed(new);
if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
key_fsgid_changed(new);
/* do it
* RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
* in set_user().
*/
if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns)
inc_rlimit_ucounts(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns)
dec_rlimit_ucounts(old->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
/* send notifications */
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) ||
!uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid) ||
!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
if (!gid_eq(new->gid, old->gid) ||
!gid_eq(new->egid, old->egid) ||
!gid_eq(new->sgid, old->sgid) ||
!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
put_cred_many(old, 2);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
/**
* abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
* @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
*
* Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
* current task.
*/
void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
{
kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%ld})", new,
atomic_long_read(&new->usage));
BUG_ON(atomic_long_read(&new->usage) < 1);
put_cred(new);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
/**
* override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
*
* Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
* process, returning the old set for later reversion.
*/
const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
const struct cred *old = current->cred;
kdebug("override_creds(%p{%ld})", new,
atomic_long_read(&new->usage));
/*
* NOTE! This uses 'get_new_cred()' rather than 'get_cred()'.
*
* That means that we do not clear the 'non_rcu' flag, since
* we are only installing the cred into the thread-synchronous
* '->cred' pointer, not the '->real_cred' pointer that is
* visible to other threads under RCU.
*/
get_new_cred((struct cred *)new);
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%ld}", old,
atomic_long_read(&old->usage));
return old;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
/**
* revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
* @old: The credentials to be restored
*
* Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
* discarding the override set.
*/
void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
{
const struct cred *override = current->cred;
kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%ld})", old,
atomic_long_read(&old->usage));
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
put_cred(override);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
/**
* cred_fscmp - Compare two credentials with respect to filesystem access.
* @a: The first credential
* @b: The second credential
*
* cred_cmp() will return zero if both credentials have the same
* fsuid, fsgid, and supplementary groups. That is, if they will both
* provide the same access to files based on mode/uid/gid.
* If the credentials are different, then either -1 or 1 will
* be returned depending on whether @a comes before or after @b
* respectively in an arbitrary, but stable, ordering of credentials.
*
* Return: -1, 0, or 1 depending on comparison
*/
int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *a, const struct cred *b)
{
struct group_info *ga, *gb;
int g;
if (a == b)
return 0;
if (uid_lt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid))
return -1;
if (uid_gt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid))
return 1;
if (gid_lt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid))
return -1;
if (gid_gt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid))
return 1;
ga = a->group_info;
gb = b->group_info;
if (ga == gb)
return 0;
if (ga == NULL)
return -1;
if (gb == NULL)
return 1;
if (ga->ngroups < gb->ngroups)
return -1;
if (ga->ngroups > gb->ngroups)
return 1;
for (g = 0; g < ga->ngroups; g++) {
if (gid_lt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g]))
return -1;
if (gid_gt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g]))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cred_fscmp);
int set_cred_ucounts(struct cred *new)
{
struct ucounts *new_ucounts, *old_ucounts = new->ucounts;
/*
* This optimization is needed because alloc_ucounts() uses locks
* for table lookups.
*/
if (old_ucounts->ns == new->user_ns && uid_eq(old_ucounts->uid, new->uid))
return 0;
if (!(new_ucounts = alloc_ucounts(new->user_ns, new->uid)))
return -EAGAIN;
new->ucounts = new_ucounts;
put_ucounts(old_ucounts);
return 0;
}
/*
* initialise the credentials stuff
*/
void __init cred_init(void)
{
/* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
cred_jar = KMEM_CACHE(cred,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT);
}
/**
* prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
* @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
*
* Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to
* override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
* task that requires a different subjective context.
*
* @daemon is used to provide a base cred, with the security data derived from
* that; if this is "&init_task", they'll be set to 0, no groups, full
* capabilities, and no keys.
*
* The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
*
* Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
*/
struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!daemon))
return NULL;
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
old = get_task_cred(daemon);
*new = *old;
new->non_rcu = 0;
atomic_long_set(&new->usage, 1);
get_uid(new->user);
get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
new->session_keyring = NULL;
new->process_keyring = NULL;
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
new->request_key_auth = NULL;
new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
new->security = NULL;
#endif
new->ucounts = get_ucounts(new->ucounts);
if (!new->ucounts)
goto error;
if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
goto error;
put_cred(old);
return new;
error:
put_cred(new);
put_cred(old);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
* @secid: The LSM security ID to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
/**
* set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
* @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The
* security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
* interpreted by the LSM.
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
u32 secid;
int ret;
ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return set_security_override(new, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
/**
* set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
* @inode: The inode to take the context from
*
* Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
* as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
* the same MAC context as that inode.
*/
int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
return -EINVAL;
new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);