Author | Tokens | Token Proportion | Commits | Commit Proportion |
---|---|---|---|---|
Mimi Zohar | 1448 | 42.33% | 27 | 26.21% |
Dmitry Kasatkin | 658 | 19.23% | 14 | 13.59% |
Thiago Jung Bauermann | 350 | 10.23% | 5 | 4.85% |
Roberto Sassu | 219 | 6.40% | 12 | 11.65% |
THOBY Simon | 189 | 5.52% | 4 | 3.88% |
Nayna Jain | 162 | 4.74% | 2 | 1.94% |
Christian Brauner | 79 | 2.31% | 5 | 4.85% |
Bruno Meneguele | 65 | 1.90% | 4 | 3.88% |
Matthew Garrett | 41 | 1.20% | 3 | 2.91% |
Ard Biesheuvel | 36 | 1.05% | 1 | 0.97% |
Eric Snowberg | 30 | 0.88% | 1 | 0.97% |
Andreas Gruenbacher | 27 | 0.79% | 1 | 0.97% |
James Morris | 16 | 0.47% | 1 | 0.97% |
Seth Forshee | 15 | 0.44% | 1 | 0.97% |
David Howells | 13 | 0.38% | 1 | 0.97% |
Gustavo A. R. Silva | 13 | 0.38% | 3 | 2.91% |
Christoph Hellwig | 10 | 0.29% | 2 | 1.94% |
Miklos Szeredi | 6 | 0.18% | 1 | 0.97% |
Eric Richter | 6 | 0.18% | 2 | 1.94% |
Huaxin Lu | 6 | 0.18% | 1 | 0.97% |
Paul Moore | 6 | 0.18% | 2 | 1.94% |
David Woodhouse | 5 | 0.15% | 1 | 0.97% |
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian | 4 | 0.12% | 1 | 0.97% |
Tycho Andersen | 4 | 0.12% | 1 | 0.97% |
Andi Kleen | 4 | 0.12% | 1 | 0.97% |
Thomas Gleixner | 2 | 0.06% | 1 | 0.97% |
Tushar Sugandhi | 2 | 0.06% | 1 | 0.97% |
Tyler Hicks | 2 | 0.06% | 1 | 0.97% |
Paul Gortmaker | 2 | 0.06% | 2 | 1.94% |
Richard Guy Briggs | 1 | 0.03% | 1 | 0.97% |
Total | 3421 | 103 |
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation * * Author: * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> */ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/fsverity.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h> #include "ima.h" #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM static char *ima_appraise_cmdline_default __initdata; core_param(ima_appraise, ima_appraise_cmdline_default, charp, 0); void __init ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void) { const char *str = ima_appraise_cmdline_default; bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot(); int appraisal_state = ima_appraise; if (!str) return; if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) appraisal_state = 0; else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0) appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG; else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0) appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; else pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str); /* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled, * keep its default */ if (sb_state) { if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option", str); } else { ima_appraise = appraisal_state; } } #endif /* * is_ima_appraise_enabled - return appraise status * * Only return enabled, if not in ima_appraise="fix" or "log" modes. */ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; } /* * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag * * Return 1 to appraise or hash */ int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { u32 secid; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct ima_iint_cache *iint) { int rc, offset; u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; if (algo <= HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { offset = 1; iint->ima_hash->xattr.sha1.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; } else { offset = 0; iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG; iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo; } rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset], (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) + iint->ima_hash->length, 0); return rc; } /* Return specific func appraised cached result */ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func) { switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT: return iint->ima_mmap_status; case BPRM_CHECK: return iint->ima_bprm_status; case CREDS_CHECK: return iint->ima_creds_status; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: return iint->ima_file_status; case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1: default: return iint->ima_read_status; } } static void ima_set_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func, enum integrity_status status) { switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT: iint->ima_mmap_status = status; break; case BPRM_CHECK: iint->ima_bprm_status = status; break; case CREDS_CHECK: iint->ima_creds_status = status; break; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: iint->ima_file_status = status; break; case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1: default: iint->ima_read_status = status; break; } } static void ima_cache_flags(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func) { switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: case MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT: iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; case BPRM_CHECK: iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; case CREDS_CHECK: iint->flags |= (IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1: default: iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; } } enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; enum hash_algo ret; if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) /* return default hash algo */ return ima_hash_algo; switch (xattr_value->type) { case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG: sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) return ima_hash_algo; return sig->hash_algo; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) return ima_hash_algo; return sig->hash_algo; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: /* first byte contains algorithm id */ ret = xattr_value->data[0]; if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) return ret; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: /* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len == 21) { unsigned int zero = 0; if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) return HASH_ALGO_MD5; else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; } else if (xattr_len == 17) return HASH_ALGO_MD5; break; } /* return default hash algo */ return ima_hash_algo; } int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len) { int ret; ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value, xattr_len, GFP_NOFS); if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ret = 0; return ret; } /* * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type] * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo] * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash * * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data. * * Signing the ima_file_id struct is currently only supported for * IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG type xattrs. * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type, enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest, struct ima_digest_data *hash) { struct ima_file_id file_id = { .hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, .hash_algorithm = algo}; unsigned int unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_digest_size[algo]; if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG) return -EINVAL; memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, hash_digest_size[algo]); hash->algo = algo; hash->length = hash_digest_size[algo]; return ima_calc_buffer_hash(&file_id, sizeof(file_id) - unused, hash); } /* * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature * * Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents. * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) { struct ima_max_digest_data hash; struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0; int mask; switch (xattr_value->type) { case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: /* first byte contains algorithm id */ hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) *cause = "verity-signature-required"; else *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } else { set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) /* * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); else rc = -EINVAL; if (rc) { *cause = "invalid-hash"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } *status = INTEGRITY_PASS; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); mask = IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED; if ((iint->flags & mask) == mask) { *cause = "verity-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; if (sig->version >= 3) { *cause = "invalid-signature-version"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, (const char *)xattr_value, xattr_len, iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { *status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; break; } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, (const char *)xattr_value, xattr_len, iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); if (rc) { *cause = "invalid-signature"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } else { *status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } break; case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { if (!(iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) { *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } } sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; if (sig->version != 3) { *cause = "invalid-signature-version"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } rc = calc_file_id_hash(IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, iint->ima_hash->algo, iint->ima_hash->digest, container_of(&hash.hdr, struct ima_digest_data, hdr)); if (rc) { *cause = "sigv3-hashing-error"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, (const char *)xattr_value, xattr_len, hash.digest, hash.hdr.length); if (rc) { *cause = "invalid-verity-signature"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } else { *status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } break; default: *status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; *cause = "unknown-ima-data"; break; } return rc; } /* * modsig_verify - verify modsig signature * * Verify whether the signature matches the file contents. * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) { int rc; rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, modsig); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, modsig); if (rc) { *cause = "invalid-signature"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; } else { *status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } return rc; } /* * ima_check_blacklist - determine if the binary is blacklisted. * * Add the hash of the blacklisted binary to the measurement list, based * on policy. * * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted. */ int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) { enum hash_algo hash_algo; const u8 *digest = NULL; u32 digestsize = 0; int rc = 0; if (!(iint->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) return 0; if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig) { ima_get_modsig_digest(modsig, &hash_algo, &digest, &digestsize); rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize); } else if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED && iint->ima_hash) rc = is_binary_blacklisted(iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, digest, digestsize, "blacklisted-hash", NONE, pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0); return rc; } /* * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement * * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'. * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement. * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig) { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; int rc = xattr_len; bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig; /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; /* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) { if (rc && rc != -ENODATA) goto out; if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) cause = "verity-signature-required"; else cause = "IMA-signature-required"; } else { cause = "missing-hash"; } status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) || (inode->i_size == 0))) status = INTEGRITY_PASS; goto out; } status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc < 0 ? 0 : rc); switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ if (try_modsig) break; fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); cause = "invalid-fail-immutable"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; goto out; default: WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status); } if (xattr_value) rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause); /* * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't * known, then try verifying the modsig. */ if (try_modsig && (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type == IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG || rc == -ENOKEY)) rc = modsig_verify(func, modsig, &status, &cause); out: /* * File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified. * When such filesystems are mounted by an untrusted mounter or on a * system not willing to accept such a risk, fail the file signature * verification. */ if ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) && ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) || (iint->flags & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) { status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; cause = "unverifiable-signature"; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { /* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && !try_modsig && (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint)) status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } /* * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but * without data. */ if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) { status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); } else { ima_cache_flags(iint, func); } ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status); return status; } /* * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value */ void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) { struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); int rc = 0; /* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */ if (test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) return; if ((iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH)) return; rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL); if (rc < 0) return; inode_lock(file_inode(file)); ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint); inode_unlock(file_inode(file)); } /** * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status * * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise. * * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct ima_iint_cache *iint; int action; if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return; action = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); iint = ima_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); if (!action) clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); } } /* * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima' * * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. */ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return 1; } return 0; } static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; iint = ima_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return; iint->measured_pcrs = 0; set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); if (digsig) set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); else clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } /** * validate_hash_algo() - Block setxattr with unsupported hash algorithms * @dentry: object of the setxattr() * @xattr_value: userland supplied xattr value * @xattr_value_len: length of xattr_value * * The xattr value is mapped to its hash algorithm, and this algorithm * must be built in the kernel for the setxattr to be allowed. * * Emit an audit message when the algorithm is invalid. * * Return: 0 on success, else an error. */ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry, const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { char *path = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; enum hash_algo xattr_hash_algo; const char *errmsg = "unavailable-hash-algorithm"; unsigned int allowed_hashes; xattr_hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_value_len); allowed_hashes = atomic_read(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms); if (allowed_hashes) { /* success if the algorithm is allowed in the ima policy */ if (allowed_hashes & (1U << xattr_hash_algo)) return 0; /* * We use a different audit message when the hash algorithm * is denied by a policy rule, instead of not being built * in the kernel image */ errmsg = "denied-hash-algorithm"; } else { if (likely(xattr_hash_algo == ima_hash_algo)) return 0; /* allow any xattr using an algorithm built in the kernel */ if (crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[xattr_hash_algo], 0, 0)) return 0; } pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (!pathbuf) return -EACCES; path = dentry_path(dentry, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry), path, "set_data", errmsg, -EACCES, 0); kfree(pathbuf); return -EACCES; } static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; int digsig = 0; int result; int err; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) { if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; err = validate_hash_algo(dentry, xvalue, xattr_value_len); if (err) return err; digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); } if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); if (result == 1) result = 0; } return result; } static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); return 0; } static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); if (result == 1) result = 0; } return result; } static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) { return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); } static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl), }; void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid) { security_add_hooks(ima_appraise_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_appraise_hooks), lsmid); }
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