Author | Tokens | Token Proportion | Commits | Commit Proportion |
---|---|---|---|---|
Nicolai Stange | 1948 | 64.27% | 5 | 19.23% |
Salvatore Benedetto | 752 | 24.81% | 2 | 7.69% |
Stephan Mueller | 252 | 8.31% | 4 | 15.38% |
Eric Biggers | 32 | 1.06% | 3 | 11.54% |
James Morris | 17 | 0.56% | 2 | 7.69% |
Herbert Xu | 9 | 0.30% | 2 | 7.69% |
Rui Y Wang | 7 | 0.23% | 1 | 3.85% |
Tudor-Dan Ambarus | 6 | 0.20% | 2 | 7.69% |
Thomas Gleixner | 2 | 0.07% | 1 | 3.85% |
Xiu Jianfeng | 2 | 0.07% | 1 | 3.85% |
David S. Miller | 2 | 0.07% | 1 | 3.85% |
Gustavo A. R. Silva | 1 | 0.03% | 1 | 3.85% |
Mat Martineau | 1 | 0.03% | 1 | 3.85% |
Total | 3031 | 26 |
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631] * * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com> */ #include <linux/fips.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h> #include <crypto/kpp.h> #include <crypto/dh.h> #include <crypto/rng.h> #include <linux/mpi.h> struct dh_ctx { MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ }; static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx) { mpi_free(ctx->p); mpi_free(ctx->g); mpi_free(ctx->xa); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } /* * If base is g we compute the public key * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] */ static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val) { /* val = base^xa mod p */ return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p); } static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); } static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len) { if (fips_enabled) return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0; return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0; } static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params) { if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3)) return -EINVAL; ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size); if (!ctx->p) return -EINVAL; ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size); if (!ctx->g) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, unsigned int len) { struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); struct dh params; /* Free the old MPI key if any */ dh_clear_ctx(ctx); if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0) goto err_clear_ctx; if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0) goto err_clear_ctx; ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size); if (!ctx->xa) goto err_clear_ctx; return 0; err_clear_ctx: dh_clear_ctx(ctx); return -EINVAL; } /* * SP800-56A public key verification: * * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed. * * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. */ static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y) { if (unlikely(!ctx->p)) return -EINVAL; /* * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2. * * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1. */ if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0) return -EINVAL; /* * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p * * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2. */ if (fips_enabled) { MPI val, q; int ret; val = mpi_alloc(0); if (!val) return -ENOMEM; q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p)); if (!q) { mpi_free(val); return -ENOMEM; } /* * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one * from it before shifting to the right. */ mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1); ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p); mpi_free(q); if (ret) { mpi_free(val); return ret; } ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1); mpi_free(val); if (ret != 0) return -EINVAL; } return 0; } static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req) { struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req); struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0); int ret = 0; int sign; if (!val) return -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto err_free_val; } if (req->src) { base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len); if (!base) { ret = -EINVAL; goto err_free_val; } ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base); if (ret) goto err_free_base; } else { base = ctx->g; } ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val); if (ret) goto err_free_base; if (fips_enabled) { /* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */ if (req->src) { MPI pone; /* z <= 1 */ if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) { ret = -EBADMSG; goto err_free_base; } /* z == p - 1 */ pone = mpi_alloc(0); if (!pone) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto err_free_base; } ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1); if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val)) ret = -EBADMSG; mpi_free(pone); if (ret) goto err_free_base; /* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */ } else { if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto err_free_val; } } } ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign); if (ret) goto err_free_base; if (sign < 0) ret = -EBADMSG; err_free_base: if (req->src) mpi_free(base); err_free_val: mpi_free(val); return ret; } static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); return mpi_get_size(ctx->p); } static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); dh_clear_ctx(ctx); } static struct kpp_alg dh = { .set_secret = dh_set_secret, .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value, .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value, .max_size = dh_max_size, .exit = dh_exit_tfm, .base = { .cra_name = "dh", .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic", .cra_priority = 100, .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx), }, }; struct dh_safe_prime { unsigned int max_strength; unsigned int p_size; const char *p; }; static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 }; struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx { struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn; const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime; }; struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx { struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; }; static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst) { struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn); kfree(inst); } static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx( struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm)); } static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn); if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) + crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)); return 0; } static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); } static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val) { unsigned int i; for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) { u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]); tmp += val; val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1; dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp); } return val; } static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime, unsigned int *key_size) { unsigned int n, oversampling_size; __be64 *key; int err; u64 h, o; /* * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3, * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp.. * * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups. * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to * avoid excessively large private keys while still * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[], * the following holds for such N: * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64 * bits and * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound. */ n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength); WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1)); n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */ /* * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits * required as per 5.6.1.1.3. */ oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64); key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); /* * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer. */ err = -EFAULT; if (crypto_get_default_rng()) goto out_err; err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key, oversampling_size); crypto_put_default_rng(); if (err) goto out_err; /* * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus, * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N. * * For step 6, calculate * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1. * * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h, * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds. * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0] * representing the 64 most significant bits and l * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark * from above, * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1). * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2. * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one, * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will * be zero after a second reduction: * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1). * At this point, it is still possible that * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1) * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of * the final increment overflowing in this case. */ h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]); h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); WARN_ON_ONCE(h); /* Increment to obtain the final result. */ o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1); /* * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to * one, c.f. above. */ if (o) key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1); /* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */ *key_size = n << 3; /* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */ memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size); return key; out_err: kfree_sensitive(key); return ERR_PTR(err); } static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer, unsigned int len) { struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct dh params = {}; void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL; unsigned int buf_size; int err; if (buffer) { err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms); if (err) return err; if (params.p_size || params.g_size) return -EINVAL; } params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p; params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size; params.g = safe_prime_g; params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g); if (!params.key_size) { key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime, ¶ms.key_size); if (IS_ERR(key)) return PTR_ERR(key); params.key = key; } buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms); buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms); if (err) goto out; err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size); out: kfree_sensitive(buf); kfree_sensitive(key); return err; } static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err) { struct kpp_request *req = data; kpp_request_complete(req, err); } static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req) { struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req)); struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req); kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags, dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req); kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len); kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len); return dh_req; } static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req) { struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req); } static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req) { struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req); } static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); } static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create( struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime) { struct kpp_instance *inst; struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx; const char *dh_name; struct kpp_alg *dh_alg; u32 mask; int err; err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask); if (err) return err; dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]); if (IS_ERR(dh_name)) return PTR_ERR(dh_name); inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!inst) return -ENOMEM; ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst), dh_name, 0, mask); if (err) goto err_free_inst; err = -EINVAL; dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn); if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh")) goto err_free_inst; ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime; err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst), tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base); if (err) goto err_free_inst; inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret; inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key; inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret; inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size; inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm; inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm; inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority; inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx); inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance; err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst); if (err) goto err_free_inst; return 0; err_free_inst: dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst); return err; } #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = { .max_strength = 112, .p_size = 256, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = { .max_strength = 128, .p_size = 384, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = { .max_strength = 152, .p_size = 512, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = { .max_strength = 176, .p_size = 768, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = { .max_strength = 200, .p_size = 1024, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38" "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43" "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef" "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65" "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4" "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c" "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22" "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee" "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc" "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9" "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31" "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8" "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30" "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe" "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d" "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c" "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime); } static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = { { .name = "ffdhe2048", .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe3072", .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe4096", .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe6144", .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe8192", .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, }; #else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {}; #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ static int __init dh_init(void) { int err; err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh); if (err) return err; err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); if (err) { crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); return err; } return 0; } static void __exit dh_exit(void) { crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); } subsys_initcall(dh_init); module_exit(dh_exit); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");
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